Security: Unpinned remote model downloads allow supply-chain substitution#249
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tuanaiseo wants to merge 1 commit intoOpenBMB:mainfrom
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…hain `from_pretrained` downloads model artifacts from Hugging Face based on runtime-provided identifiers. Without pinning to a specific immutable revision/commit hash and integrity verification, a changed or compromised upstream repository can silently alter downloaded artifacts, potentially introducing malicious weights or backdoored configs. Affected files: core.py Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Could you clarify the concrete use case for adding |
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Problem
from_pretraineddownloads model artifacts from Hugging Face based on runtime-provided identifiers. Without pinning to a specific immutable revision/commit hash and integrity verification, a changed or compromised upstream repository can silently alter downloaded artifacts, potentially introducing malicious weights or backdoored configs.Severity:
mediumFile:
src/voxcpm/core.pySolution
Require/encourage a pinned
revision(commit SHA), validate file hashes, and optionally enforce an allowlist of trusted model IDs. Surface warnings when loading unpinned remote artifacts.Changes
src/voxcpm/core.py(modified)Testing